Book:

Collective Allism: The Universal Plurality as Fundamental Reality. Under contract with Springer. Final manuscript to be submitted April 2025.

Abstract. I articulate a novel view about fundamental reality, an alternative to the traditional opposition between monism and pluralism. Collective allism is the view that what’s metaphysically fundamental is neither the universe as a whole nor some fragments thereof, but the plurality of all entities, i.e. all entities taken collectively. The book systematically develops the view and argues that considerations about mereological infinitism, emergence, natural laws, and relations give it an edge over monism and pluralism.

Papers:

Identity Universalism and Ontological Explosion, forthcoming in Synthese

Abstract: I show that the combination of unrestricted composition and composition as identity is formally analogous to Frege’s second-order theory of objects and properties, including a commitment to an exact analogue of Basic Law V. I explain how the view manages to avert a corresponding version of Russell’s paradox, and how it nonetheless remains in conflict with the Cantorian insight about cardinality underlying the paradox. I argue that such a conflict can be dissipated by thinking about the view in terms of fundamentality.

Ontological Collectivism, Philosophical Perspectives 36 (1), 2022

Abstract: I give shape to a neglected debate in metaphysics, the debate over the ontological priority between individuality and collectivity. I distinguish the debate from more familiar ones in the recent literature and articulate what I call ontological collectivism, the view that collectivity is prior to individuality. I defend the in-principle intelligibility of the view from forceful general objections and argue that not only is it coherent but also of significant interest to the literature: it allows for overlooked alternatives on a variety of central discussions.

Parthood and Location, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol. 6, 2011

Abstract. I articulate principles of what has come to be known as mereological harmony and explore the question of whether they are metaphysically necessary. I articulate an otherwise plausible, weak recombination principle from which it follows that the part-whole structure of the material world and the part-whole structure of spacetime may fail to misalign in very radical ways.

The Elamite Picture of Reality, to appear in a volume on mereology and location edited by Cody Gilmore, Anthony Eagle, and Shieva Kleinschmidt

Abstract. I explore how a view on which spatiotemporal reality consists of extended simples can accommodate the manifest image. I distinguish three strategies for accommodation, I argue that only one of them has adequate resources to do that. On this view, ordinary continuants are neither temporally extended simples nor diachronic fusions thereof. Rather, they are metaphysically derivative from the combined qualitative complexity of such simples and their fusions. I call the view the Elamite picture of reality, given similarities it bears to an art form originating in ancient Elam. 

Harmonious Four-Dimensionalist Endurantism, under review

Abstract. I articulate a version of the view that reality consists of temporally extended simples that is immune to the argument from vagueness for temporal parts and that is perfectly compatible with diachronic universalism. Following Josh Parsons’s classification of views about persistence, I take this to be a four-dimensionalist form of endurantism (4DE, for short). What’s distinctive about my version of 4DE is that it incorporates an independently plausible harmony principle about temporal location. I formulate the relevant harmony principle and show that it affords 4DEists a novel, principled way of resisting the argument from vagueness, and ensures that their view is in fact perfectly compatible with unrestricted diachronic composition.

Mereological Indeterminacy at Logically Determinate Worlds, under review

Abstract. I argue that indeterminacy in matters of part and whole does not require indeterminacy in matters of identity, existence, or cardinality. I argue that if we distinguish between matters of mereology and matters of spatiotemporal location it is possible for parthood and composition to be indeterminate without identity, existence, or cardinality being indeterminate. This affords a new, general line of defense for friends of mereological indeterminacy against influential objections in the literature. More generally, it undermines an assumption shared by both friends and foes of mereological indeterminacy, and in fact by much of the recent literature on metaphysics: that there is a tight link between the mereological structure of reality and what one might regard as its logical structure.

Collective Allism, under review

Abstract. I articulate a novel view about fundamental reality, an alternative priority monism and priority pluralism that I call collective allism. Using plural resources, I show that the range of answers to the question of fundamental mereology is much broader than has been previously realized. I argue that only four answers—two forms of pluralism, monism, and collective allism—satisfy independent constraints on fundamentality. I argue that considerations of mereological infinitism and emergence give an edge to collective allism over monism and pluralism.

Fundamental property assignments, in progress

Abstract. I articulate a Humean puzzle about fundamental properties. Using higher-order resources, I argue for a solution according to which the locus of fundamentality aren’t properties, but what I call property assignments.

Instantiation and Location, in progress

Abstract. I articulate a theory of locative instantiation, and argue that it affords friends of distributional properties resources to accommodate a nuanced picture of reality.

Wholes and All Their Parts, in progress

Abstract. I articulate a novel form of strong composition as identity and show that it avoids collapsing plurals and mereology.

The Higher-Order Grounds of Reality, in progress

Abstract. Building upon recent discussions about ontological priority and higher-order metaphysics, I give shape to the debate between a broadly Platonic and a broadly Aristotelian conception of reality. On the Platonic conception, first-order facts are grounded in higher-order facts; on the Aristotelian conception, higher-order facts are grounded in first-order facts. I explore the prospects of the Platonic conception, focusing on the higher-order grounds of first-order existence and identity.

Given at several places and cited in the literature, but no longer in progress:

Composition, Identity, and the Number of Things, unpublished 2010

The content of this paper has been incorporated into “Identity Universalism and Ontological Explosion”